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As currently designed and flown, spacecraft need comiderable maintenance to perform
their missions. Mission readiness is jeopardized, however, because the ground support that
provides the maintenance is vulnerable to both ho6tile ac_ and operator errors. To
address this, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California Institute of Technology, was
commissioned in March 1980 by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research to lead a
study of autonomous spacecraft m'aint_nance (ASM). ASM is a spacecraft design that
tolerates hardware and software failures and design faults, while requiring minimum
ground contact to perform the mission, The study group, composed of experts from
industry, academia, and NASA, was to identify critical issues related to ASM technology
development and detail the infusion of this technoh)gy into filture Air Force spacecraft
systems. To facilitate this, three subgroups were formed: the Spacecraft System Tech-
nology Working Group. composed of spacecraft system specialists from various spacecraft
suppliers: the Fault-Tolerant Technolo_' Working Group. composed of speci',dists in
fauh-tt+lerant compute_ technology from academic and independent research institutions;
and tile Academic Assessment Commit tee. con)prised of leading researchers from academic
and independent research iust_tutions.
These groups were brotlgh! together in a series of three workshops held at JPL in May.
Jol}. and August It)SO, undel the guidance of the Stud) Pla_m,ng Committee. The
spacecrafl _yslems and l atlll-lo[erant wolkln_ group members presented their organiza-
t,ioIIS' cu_renl capabilities in spaceclaft and fault-tolerant computers, respectively, from
which a state-of-the-ar_ techmcal data base was est:tblished. A set of conceptual design
regtmemer)ts _,as then developed, detailing what an ASM spacecraft must do. Thus.
kno_.nlg on one h;.ll)t] the capabilities t)l" current spacecral't, and. on the other, the require-
i'l_etlls Iol ASM. the v,'orkiug groups beg;in a search for the optimuln pk_n t'o_ the ti_tegra-
t,ol) of ASM into spacecraft.
The tnal,_r ploducl ot the Spacecraft System Technology Working Group was the
Implen_entallon Plan. which details tile group's tecolmnended approach for incorporating
ASM capabdlties Inlo operational spacecraft by I t)/4t). The Fault-Tolerant "l'echnolo_'
Working (_;toup and the A,:adelllic Assessment Conlnlittee together established the
Re.,earch Agenda, which outlines ba_;ic research activities required to fill technological
gaps.
It is hi,|+,'2 ,nat the material presented here will provide guidance t'or the evolution
of l_,'t,_e ,_pacectal+l s}.,,tellls. The stud_, participants believe that the interaction between
the _,otklllg grou|',s has been s._llerglsllc, and has cotllribllted to all Increased av,'areness
ot potential te,:hu_log.', _:apabdtttes.
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Tlus report outlines a plan to incorporate autonomous spacecraft maintenance (ASM)
capabilities into Air Force spacecraft by 1989. These capabilities include the successful
operation of the spacecraft without ground-operator intervention for extended periods of
time. Autonomous maintenance requires extensive use of onboard fault detection, isola.
tion, and recovery mechanisms integrated into the spacecraft within a hierarchical archi-
tecture. These mechanisms, 'along with a fault-tolerant data processing system (including a
n_mvolatile backup memory) and an autonomous navigation capability, are needed to
replace the routine servicing that is presently performed by the gzound system.
As part of this study, the state-of the-art fault-handling capabilities of various space-
craft and computers are described, and a set of conceptual design requirements needed
to achieve ASM are established. From these two inputs, an implementation plan describ-
ing near-term technology development needed for an ASM proof-of-concept demonstra-
tion by I t_85, and a research agenda addressing long-range academic research for an
advanced ASM system of the Iqq0s, are established.
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Executive Summary
I. Introduction
Spacecraft are presently designed to interact with the
ground-control/operations center for routine maintenance and
for fault diagnosis and reconfiguration in tile event of onboard
problems. During periods of conflict, ho_'ever, the control'
operations center is vulnerable to hostile action. To continue
operation during these periods, spacecraft must be capable of
at_tonomously performing predetermined ground functions; this
is accomplished by :mtonomous ._pacecraft maintenance
IAfiM t, ASM maintains the spacecraft m a state of readiness by
providitlg spacecraft design,s that require m, ground contact/
inlerzlclhm for onboard deteclion, isolation, and recovery
from faulls or for routine operations such as power manage-
lllent.
The sltld} grmlp was commi._sioned to determine a way to
inct_rporate ..XSM rote spacecraft. To do this, they first made a
state.el-the-art techllolog.',, assesslllent _3f _,.'tlrtellI spacecraft
systenls, alld |hell dete_vnil_ed soll_e general reqtllrelnenls for
an ASM spacecraft. From this. the_ developed the Inlple-
nlenlation Plan that leads to the incorporation of ASM into
operational spacecra0 h_ I'),_t_ Included m this was all
identificati_m of lhe needed technt_h+gies to fill immediate
gaps To addresx Iollger-telm tecttnolog,,, |sSl, les I_r use ill a
second-.,-'cnerat_on ASM spacecraft of tile IqqOs, tile study
era,tip al_o devel_,ped Ihe Research :_genda
II. State-of-the-Art Technology
The nlembers of the working grmlps presented examples of
current spacecraft and f_tllt-toleratlt conlputer systems.
describing their fault-handling characteristics. Examples of the
spacecraft presented were: FLTSATCOM and IEASA'I" (com-
municationsL Global Positioning System (navigation}. Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program {meteorologicalL NASA's
Multinlission Modular Spacecraft (nlultimissionL and Voyager
{planetary explorationl. Although each of these spacecraft
pe,form some ft, nctions autononlolisly, none is capable of
lully autov mlous operation, mainly because this capability
has never been teqt, ired or specified. The fault-tolerant
computers described were: Fault-Tolerant Spaceborne Cmn-
puter and Building Block Fault-Tolerant Computer {space-
borne), Cramp. Cnl*, and C.vmp (conunercial): and Software
hnplemented Fault-Tolerance and Fault-Tolerant Multipro-
cessor {commercial aviation). Of the fault-tolerant computers
presented, none is operational yet. and only the Fault-Tolerant
Spaceborne ('omputer and Building Block Fault-Tolerant
('omputer will be applicable to spacecraft systems. The others.
however, provided examples of design methodologies and
techniques that may be applicable to spacebome computers.
Each of the spacecraft that was presented required interac-
tion with the grt,und system for nt,rmal operations manage-
ment. as well as fault diagnosis and recovery. This interaction
was needed for such things as power nlanagement, housekeep-
irlg. navigation corrections, and any abnormalities thal
occurred. Having The spacecraft rely on the cont rolioperations
center makes tile overall space systenl as vulnerable as the
control'operations center. It also creates a long "down time"
wherever a lault occurs, because the fault must be diagnosed
and reconfiguration commands must be developed by tile
control,'operations center. This vulnerability and down time
can be reduced by shifting the management of routine
operations and fault handling from the ground to the
spacecraft (i.e., the spacecraft performs them autonomously).
Thus, tile need for ASM is recognized: furthermore, the
study group belie.yes that the technology available in today's
spacecraft systems is a good foundation from which to
proceed to ASM.
III. The _qU-En_nceU
The impact of ASM oil future Air Force spacecraft is based
UlXm an analysis of the current system's ability to meet the
candidate design requirements formulated by the study group.
In summary, these ASM conceptual design requirements are:
(I)The ASM spacecraft shall operate without ground
intervention for up to 60 days with no performance
degradation, and up to O months with degraded, but
acceptable, performance, fThe actual periods o|" auto-
nomy may vary with different nrissitm applications:
however, tile participants felt that these were worth-
while goals for this study.)
121 ASM shall not reduce the spacecrafts' performance or
design lifetime.
131 Tile ground segment shall always be able It) override
ASM actions and interrogate tile spaceclaft for fault-
managennent data (attdit trailsL
Satisfying these design requirements implies tile nlovement
Of routJlle inlaintenance and olYN2ratiotls l'rolll the grollnd
segment to tile space se_2n|ellt. Tile control't+pelations center
_,+:11assume a supervisorx role, potentially less complex, while
the space segment will become more complex. Tile resulting
benefits of ASM _xould then include: l llreduced system
vuluelability because the spacecraft is no Ioxlger dependent
ripen tile conlrol'operalionl.+, Celltcr ;.llnd 12)t'aster recove D
frolll failures {secollds illStead of Iiours or possibly da._,s).
rite mlpacl of ASM o11 spacecraft design Is expected to be
Cvt_h.ltlC, Ilal_, l ladltional >,ubsystelns ale expected to be
;.lllglllented b_, two nev+, sllbs)stelnlS: a lalllt-tolerallt data
|'_io_:esMtlg sllbs_,Stelll _it}l ntlllVOlalile back.up innelli.H_,,, and
all alltOllOIllO_.lS navigallOll stlb_x, steM.
|he S%'+.IClIIarchit¢ctule ISexpected to possess a "'layered'"
latllt-plote,:tltHI SCIIL'III_.'.enabhlng latllt colltallnllnellt at line
Iov, est po,,slbl¢ level to 11n1111Illl/e _.lll_Sx _,telln illterdepelldencles.
hn Ibis scllellle. Itldt_,ldtlal suhs)StelllS, tinder s%steltl ctmtrol,
_ill he teqtllled to diagnose local t,.llh.lteS and take ¢OtleCtive
actlOll line s_,stei11 v, lll be requited to di;.lgllose and Ct)lleCt
ambigtlt_tls talhlnes 9,.illnlll line subs,.steln inlterfaces and ASM
nlecllantslns tlneunselves, as well as to !udlclotlsl._, alloc,_ne tile
sy stein TeSOUl ces.
IV. Implemenlation Plan
The Implementation Plan focuses on near-term industrial
technology development and, most importantly, the earliest
possible system-level proof-of-concept demonstration (1985)
to support a 1989 launch. The plan stresses delivery of
"product" in a steady stream from subsystems to a complete
system for the System Program Offices' consideration and
introduction into flight programs.
As shown in Fig. 1, the Implementation Plan consists of
four major tasks. These are: {i)redesign of existing subsys-
tems to characterize and demonstrate ASM capabilities:
12) design, develop, and test all ASM system demonstration
breadboard to show that ASM is a viable concept: 13} perform
applications research required to develop an autonomous
navigation capability and a fault-tolerant data processing
capability to fill existing technology gaps; and (4)basic
research needed to develop a second-generation ASM system
t\_r the Iq9Os. A section of this report, "Research Agenda,"
elaborates upon Task 4.
A bt, dgetary resource estimate for tile proposed ASM
program is $3b.4M {FY80 dollars} over five years. For several
reasons, this figure should be considered only an estimate.
First. the cost of developing the new technology is not well
known. Second, a specific missi.on application has not been
assumed, and so candidate spacecraft could not be assumed.
Finally, substantiating data was not provided by the industrial
participants. For these reasons, a more definiti'+e cost study
should be performed in tile initial phase of the activity.
V. Research Agenda
Tile Research Agenda proposes basic research that is a
synergistic part o|" the ASM program. Future ASM develop-
ment activities are t\_cused on five areas: (I)very-large-scale
integration _VI.SI) technology, which includes self-testing
VL,SI and on-chip redtmdancy: 12) system architecture, which
addresses spacecraft organizational issues, architectural devel-
opntents, and adv:lnccd system studies: 13) software fault-
tolerance, consisting of system partitiomng and interface
delinition, self-checking lliglnt software, and lauh-tolerant
soft_ale: 141 modelin_ and analysis, coluprised of experi-
mental testing, statistical illt+dellng, rind l'Ullcth)llal tlescrip-
tlOtn, tlnodelitlg, and x_erificath)ll: and 15) stipporting develop-
lnlelllS ileeded to lornlulale all ASM data b;.l'_e, and to build all
,.'kSM _:,pacecratt laboratt+ry.
Vl. Conclusions and Recommendations
"['lne ft+llowing ctHIchlsionls and rect+llnnlendatioll are those
of the study group participants, resulting from analysis of the
material developed during the w'orkslmps.
2
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A. Cotlcatmlone
(!) ASM, fully implemented, would reduce space system
vulnerability by eliminating spacecraft dependence on
the control/operations center for up to 6 months at a
time.
(2) The ASM capability need not impose operational con-
straints on the system user; it must be "transparent"
to the user during normal system operations.
t3) ASM would require a change in the conduct of opera-
tions and control, from dependence on a man in the
loop to dependence on machines for fault handling
and routine maintenance operations.
(4) ASM would increase the spacecraft complexity.
therefi,re, new methods for specifying, testing, and
validating ASM-enhanced spacecraft are needed.
(5) A more effective means of transferring technology
from research to applications programs wouh.! be
required so that spacecraft problems could be solved
with the latest available technology.
(6) New technology developments would be required:
needed are a highly reliable fault-tolerant data pro-
cessing system with nonvolatile backup memory to
enable autonomous maintenance, and an autonomous
navigation capability to enable independence of
routine ground operations.
(7) ASM would be a phased program; spacecraft would
not instantly become totally autonomous. The pace
of ASM development would depend on the resources,
technology, and chosen program applications that are
available. A strong corporate commitment to ASM by
the Air Force, along with a willingness by industry to
assimilate ASM, would be required to make ASM
successful.
(8) Confidence in ASM must be instilled by creation of
a systematic modeling, analysis, and demonstration
program.
(9) Although considerable technology developments are
necessary, no reqmrements for technology break-
throughs have been identified.
(10) in the opit;ion of the study group, ASM is a viable
concept.
B. Recommendation
The study group recommends that the ASM research and
technology development activities, as outlined in the ImFle-
mentation Plan and Research Agenda sections of this report,
he initiated as soon as possible. This would enable the earliest
possible spacecraft system-level proof-of-concept demonstra-
tion of ASM.
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Introduction
Currently, when certain critical failure states are detected,
spacecraft usually enter a "safe-hold" mode: ill this mode,
operations are suspended and ground intervention in the form
of reconfiguration commands is required to restore normal
operations. Spacecraft are also not presently designed to auton-
omously recover from design faults, software failures, or
changing environmental conditions.
Autonomous spacecraft maintenance is characterized by:
(1) Spacecraft design that tolerates hardware and software
failures and design faults.
(2) Spacecraft design that requires for extended periods
of time virtually no ground contact/interaction for
onboard detection, isolation, and recovery of faults, or
routine maintenance functions.
For the most part. such capabilities have been beyond the
state _f the art of spacecraft systems. This study group has
been ct)rnmissh_ned by the Air Force to address these issues,
and to detail a plan leading to the incorporation of ASM inlt)
operational spacecraft by 1q89.
I. Current Space Systems
The space system ts composed of the space segment and
the ground segment, as illustrated in Fig. 2. For this study, the
space segment consists of only the spacecraft, while the
ground segment consists of three separate entities: da_a
processing stations, communications centers, and a control/
operations center. The data processing stations and the com-
munications centers may be numerous and are payload-data
users only, whereas the control/operations center is nonre-
dundant and is responsible for the overall management of the
spacecraft.
II. Definition of the Problem
It can be seen that the h)ss of any single data processing
station or communications center will not jeopardize the space
segment: on the other hand, the loss of the control/operations
center may eventually render the entire space system ineffec.
tire, The dependence of the spacecraft on the control/opera.
tions center and the ,adnerability of the center to hostile
action and operator error are the concerns of this study.
III. Scope of the Study
Spacecraft autonomy Involves several elements: autono.
mc_us spacecraft maintenance, autonomous mission sequencing
and control, autonomous navigation, and autonomous payload
data processing. To have a completely autonomous spacecraft,
all of these elements v,ould have to be included. This study,
however, was to address only the spacecraft maintenance
ki
I
k
I
(spacecraft "health and welfare") aspect of autonomy. This
includes the maintenance of satisfactory system performance
in the presence of internal faults, and the movement of routine
maintenance functions from the ground station to the space-
craft. It is assumed that other studies will address the other
elements of autonomy. With this assumption in mind, the
following topics were addressed"
(1) The state of the art of ASM in spacecraft design.
(2) An ASM design methodology.
(3) An implementation plan leading to the demonstration
of ASM concepts.
(4) Research areas applicable to ASM.
(5) A basic research agenda that supports the development
of ASM.
These topics and their key results are discussed in the sections
that follow.
l
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DOWN LINK
GROUND SEGMENT
Fki. 2. The m m.m
State-of-the-Art Technology
The members of the Spacecraft System Technology and
Fault-l+oleranl Technology Working Groups presented descrip-
tions of the fault-handling characteristics of existing spacecraft
and fault-tolerant computer systems. These were teplesenta-
live of successfid systems designed It) operate within specific
environments: the spacecraft systems for tile space environ-
ment, and the compute[ systems _to date) within laboratory
¢nvirtmments. In this section, a sutrllnary t)f the current
capabilities of the spacecraft and fault.tolerant computer
s_ stems is given, tolh_wed by an assessment of their relevance
t,, ASM,
subject lield and because of their affiliated organization's
experience as a supplier of Air Force spacecraft for one or
more of the mission classes. Each member described exarw!es
of current spacecraft, explaining its design methodology
relating to fault handling. Numerous systems and subsystems
were described by the participants; the systems presented in
this section are examples only, representing the different
mission classes. 11 is not being suggested thai these spacecraft
are leading candidates for their mission application. Suct_ an
assessment was not a part of the study. The fault-ilandling
characteristics t)f the I"olh)wirlg spacecraft will be described:
I. Spacecraft
All _"otce satelltle_ fail be categorl/ed Illtt_ |OUr IIIISSIOfl
classes: conll|lt|lllCallOn_i, ila¥1gatlt',ll, illeleorologlC,.ll, dnd
riurvelllal)ce. During the workshops, satelhtes from each of the
clas_,es except surveillance ,_ere presented. Because sur_'etllance
satelhtes were classified, lit) detailed tntottll;.tt|t,tl was solicited.
Addmonally. presentations were gl_,en desclll?qng some of the
planetary expl,,._tatt,..l spacecraft.
Mission class
('t)nlllltlll ICd tion s
Navigation
Meteorological
MultlllllSSlOn
The membv.rs of the Spacecraft System Technoh)&y Work- Planetaq, explorat,m
mg Group were chosen because of their expertise in the .
Example spacecraft
F L'I'SAI-tJOM. LE ASAT
Global Positioning System
Defense Meteoroh+gical
Salelhte Program
Multlrr|ission Mt)dular
Spacecralt
V_yager
r!
A. Ixamm a mmm
I. Commuleatiom qmeeerdt. FLTSATCOM is a 3-_is
stabilized, 23-channel communications satellite. It flies in a
geosynchronous orbit and has a 5.year design life. Four of
these spacecraft are operational; the first was launched on Feb.
ruary 9, 1978. Its fault-handling characteristics are given in
Table I.
Tills 1. FI.TIA_ tll-heninl
Fault -tolerant I_escription
attribute
Onboard
hardware
Reliabihty achiewd by redundant components
('ru._s-st rapping
Onboard switching to ",,_fc-hold" mode
L'ndervoltal0_ detection resulting, in automatic
load shed
Battery cell monitor and swltchtng
('ommand receiver tog@le
Onboard Ntmc
_oftw,lre
.Alh,w RrOulld inlervl?ntt,.lll log failure alLll_ SlS
(;round and SWllehir_g
assisted Redundanc_ Inanagl_lnelllo11ground
t_rouIId ovcrnde _'apablllty
I.EASAT is a spin-stabilized geos_nchron_ms communi-
cations satellite designated as a functional t\_llo_..on to
F! TSAT('OM. with a design lltT of tO years. FuLtr satellites
w'ill be shuttle-launched begitming in 1984.. These satellites'
fault-handling characteristics are given in Table 2.
Tsblo I. LF..AtLAT fault-himlMq alMmlcllwtaU_
I:.lult.toletant
dltnbute l)vscrzpt|on
Automatic transfer to rate-hold mode In event of
A.tonl.lll_all) ,l_:tlsatcs redundant control
ele_.tronlt:s/nlofor drlvcf and molof Ill event
()llbL_acd of loss ot despln control
h,Hdw,ITc *No _nlglt'-polnt f,llhll'e_ In lhru_,lq.'[ o|_Vl,lllOUt_
Auh)matl_ l,lull dcle_llOn and groul_d all'rllng
Redundant Clelncnls Io Unll level
Rr_el_,t'r llml., out
Watch dog ttmer,_
- t);,b,;,"d ............................
NOlle
_,0 |'| _.I, .ire
Alh)v_ gluund inlt.r_,enlh,n Io! tatlule .indly_is
and _Itchmg(;sound
Redul_ant sv, llchlng I_)i bailers ,,.harge talcs and
a_,u_tcd
bM ter_,re,.ondllhmlnll
Redundant) mandl_nlent on ground
2. Navilation npaeecn_. The Global Positioning System
(GP$) satellite is a 3-axis stabili_ed, _misynchronous (12-hour
orbit) navigation satellite. It will enable a user to accurately
determine his position, velocity, and time. When fully opera-
tional, there will be ! 8 satellites on orbit, To date six have
been launched, the first on February 22, 1977. Each satellite is
designed fiw a mean mission duration of 5 years; the fault.
handling characteristics are given in Table 3.
v_a. _amama_amm mm-m mmmamme
Fault-tolerant
attribute Description
Full redundancy except where impractical
(e.g., structure)
Multiple redundancy m crttic;xl subassemblies
te.g., triply redundant atomic clocks)
Automatic detection and isolation
Electrical shorts, attitude loss handled by
Onboard load shedding
Jet runaway handled by watchdog logic
hard.are
Aut_m_atic detecnon and correction at unit level
lot system t_:rformance degradation failures
Earth .sensor
Conlrol F]eclronics Assembly power suppbcs
Masking of solar array system performance
degradation tai/ures
Automatic Sun reacqu|sition f_om eclipse
Onboard
No spacecraft bus software
software
Allow ground mtervcntion lot failure anal)'s0s and
switching
(.;round Redundancy management on ground
assisted Battery reconditioning
Routine health and status monitoring
Ephemeris and time update
Magnetic montentum dump
3. Meteorological spececnft. DefenseMeteorological Satel.
life Program (DMSP) Block 5D spacecraft are 3-axis stabilized
and operate in a Sun-sy.chronous polar orbit at 830kin
_450 nmt) The Bl_:k 5D spacecraft have a .'-year design life;
the first was lauttched Septentber I I. 1970. The fauit-I_andltng
characteristics ot"these satellites are given in Table 4.
4. MultimLcsion spacecraft, The Multimission Modular
Spacecraft is 3-ax_s stabtl_ed and ,:an be used f-r various
ntisstor_ classes It can be used m orbital altitudes from low-
Earth to geosynchronous. The first launch was February 14,
1980 It has a 2-year mission lifetime, and is capable of being
resupphed by the shuttle. Its fault-handling characteristics
are given in Table 5.
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Fault-tolerant Fau[t-toletazzt
attribute Description attxibute Description
Hardware watchdog timer requires periodic
response, protects against_loss of power and
dock or system lock-up _)
Hardware testing of parity, illegal instructions,
and memory addresses (computer
self-tests)
Physical and functional redundancy in
subsystems
Hardware detection/switching in power
subsystem
Redundant central processing units
Onboard
hardware
Protective software in p,-;Jer subsystem
Solar array drive control
Batteyy stare of change, low voltage,
temperature checks
Load shedding in event of faul!
Software response to errors tested in Q.) above
A
Spate memory with special software packages
to anticipate recovery after memory fail,ares
Detection/switching in subsystems other that,
power
Onboard
software
Al[ow ground intervention lot t_ulure anal_.sis
and switching
Special onboard processor test;memory
patterns, diagnostic Instruction zest
Reprogram computers
l)al_ trend anal)sis
5. Planetary exploration spacecraft. The two 3-axis stabil-
ized Voyager spacecraft.launched August 20 and September 5,
1977. are designed to explore the planets Jupiter and Saturn.
Each spacecraft was desigJled for a 4-year mission lifetime.
a}thou_ each has enough expendables fi>r possible extended
missions Table b lists Voyager's fault-handling characteristics.
B. Fault-Handling 13_ign Feutur_ Of Slmcecraft
Several observations can be made from the fault.handling
characteristics of the spacecraft presented. The spacecraft
typically employ block and functional redundancy for high
rehabtlity, as well as watchdog timers, cross-strapping, and
switching networks fi_r fault protection and self-preservation,
In general, there are no credible single-point failtres. The
gr,_und.asmsted features include such capabilities as ephenteris
and tlzrte updates, trend anal}sis, anti mt_ton reconfiguration.
Redundancy management ts done mostly on the ground, and
in all cases the ground has an override capabihty.
Block redundancy employs complete, identical, extra
components that can take over in the event of a component
Onboard
hardware
Block redundancy
No credible single-point failures in space-
craft bus
Computer failure detections twatchdog
timers) in the attitude control, commu-
nications, and power modules; reconfig-
ures spacecraft to power safe Sun-pointing
mode using analog backup system
Onboard
software
Undervoltage detection and sating
Baltery state-of-charge c_lculations
Computer self.test
Spacecraft off-pointing detection and s_3ng
Telemetry data quality checks
intern_ validJty checks for attilude deter-
ruination and control software
Mo.oJlot health arid .safety of predetermined
payload instruments with onboard
safing actions
Ground
assisted
"Allow ground ii_tervention for failure analysis
and switching
Power regulator failure detection and
corrective at*ion
Redundancy management on ground
Toble 6. VOy_l_ bull-hlm(lling ,d_rK'tmriWtk:t
Fault-tolerant
attribute Description
Onboard
hard.are
Overten, perature protection for payload
instruments
No significant single-point failures
Block and functional redundancy
Computer self-test
Nonvolatile memot _ fog Computer Command
Subsystem and Attitude and Articulation
Control Subsystem
Undervoltage protection
Onboard
_o|'t wa ft.'
Ground
assisted
Parity and code checks
Restores command link
Switches processors
Switches power elements
Switches Sun/star _nsors
Switches thrusters/plumbin_
Reprogrammable
l.vent ttmtng and event counting
Retry for some data trala_.miSSlOll errors
Bh_ck partt.s validation of ./omnl;lnd
v..'q uenccs
Switching of redundant tti, mpoflent,, _ ilh
non_.atastrt)phl_, failure modes
Alternate operating modes
+trend anal)sis and calibrations.
tfailure. There are severallevels at which block redundancy can
be applied. In ascending order these are the element, func-
tional unit, functional string, subsystem, and system levels.
Functional redundancy, on the other hand, does not
employ identical components, but instead performs nearly the
same functions using alternate system or subsystem configura-
tions, typically controlled from the ground. Functional
redundancy has an advantage over block redundancy in that it
helps avoid systematic design errors; however, it generally
does not possess equal performance capability.
In the event of a failure, the operating philosophy for the
spacecraft systems has been to rely on ground interaction to
restore successful operations. This has given rise to the safe.
hold mode in which the spacecraft is autonomously switched
to a benign state until ground interactions restore operation.
The ground action typically involves fault detection through
analysis, commanded switching to isolate the detective ele-
ment, and finally recovery procedures through reconfiguration
of available resources.
C. Current Design Methodologies
Methodologies have been defined to include procurement/
management policies and design/development procedures. The
procurement/management policies structure the development
process through the use of form_ized management reports.
design reviews, and audits. Design/development procedures
refer to the collective set of design tools and test and valida-
tion procedures that are employed during the development
process.
Design tools are employed to evaluate the adequacy of a
proposed design prior to a commitment for fabrication. Such
tools include simulation, emulation, and reliability analysis
techniques {defined by MIL-IIDBK-217). Testing procedures
strive to show that the spacecraft operates per the design
intent: they should identify fauhy components and errors in
manul'acturing. Validation programs, on the other hand, strive
to insure the a[,reement of the system realization with the
s),stem specification. This includes validation of performance,
reliability, and environmental requirements.
II. Fault-Tolerant Computing
An assessment of the state of the art in fault-tolerant
computing was undertaken as part of the ASM stud), for two
mlportant reasons, First, it ts a technolo_ that has been under
investigation for over twenty ),eats. and that has resulted m
the development of several autonomously maintained systems
(e.g. self-repairing computer systems). Second. it appears that
onboard fault-tolerant computers will be required to act as the
automated repaim_an for ASM spacecraft.
A number of fruit-tolerant computers have already been
constructed and used. The largest application is in telephone
switching systems. Most modem switching offices are autono-
mously maintained systems. The resident computer is capable
of detecting faults within itself a',d in surrounding equipment,
replacing the faulty equipment, and continuing normal service
(Ref. 1). Computers with varying degrees of autonomous
self-repair have been used in other commercial applications.
Examples are the Pluribus Multiprocessor for communications
systems, and the Tandem Computer Systems often used for
financial transactions (Ref. 2). In aerospace systems, examples
of fault-tolerant computing can be found in commercial
airplanes, the Space Shuttle, and in the Saturn V guidance
computer (Ref. 3). Thus there exists a large body of design
experience in the development of fault-tolerant (i.e., autono-
mously self-maintained) computing systems for a variety of
applications.
Although two breadboard systems have been constructed
and tested, and a third is under development, fault-tolerant
computing has not been used on current spacecraft. Two goals
of the Fault Tolerant Technology Working Group were to
provide a state-of-the-art assessment of fault-tolerant comput-
ing to the spacecraft systems technologists, and to evaluate
problems and prospects for employing fault-tolerant comput-
ing in spacecraft flight systems. Each member of the working
group is actively involved in the development of a state-of-the-
art, fault-tolerant computing system, and each made presenta-
tions on their systems.
Seven fault-tolerant computing systems were presented.
They are catagorized into three groups: (I)onboard spacecraft
computers, (2) avionics computers, and (3) commercial
computers.
A. OnUom.,'d_ Computm
Two computer systems were presented, the Fault-Tolerant
Spaceborne Computer and the Building Bh)ck Fault-Tolerant
Computer.
I. FauN-Tolerant Slmceborne Computer. The Fault-
Tolerant Spaceborne Computer is a general.purpose computer.
designed t,) Air Force specifications of high throughput and a
_5_ probability of surviving (unattended and without degra-
dation of performance) for 5 to 7 years. This machine is cap-
able of self-reconfiguratlon and resumption of computations
following internal component failures, power transients, and
radiation events.
+_
The Fault-Tolerant Spacebome Computer is in an advanced
state of development. A laboratory breadboard has been
constructed and the fault-tolerance features verified by exper-
imental testing (e.g., insertion of faults and verifying proper
recovery). The machine is based on complementary metal-
oxide semiconducted-silicon on sapphire LSI technology. It
is not available for flight use due to an inability to obtain
radiation-hardened (1000 gate/chip) integrated circuits
(Ref. 4).
2. Building Block Fault-Tolerant Computer. The Building
Block Fault-Tolerant Computer is a fault-tolerant distributed
computer system architecture. It is aimed at spacecraft systems
that employ a large number of microcomputers embedded in
various subsystems, and is an outgrowth of the Unified Data
System architecture developed at JPL (Ref. 5). This architec-
ture uses a small set of standard building block circuits that
allow existing microprocessors and memories to be connected
together into fault-tolerant distributed computer systems. The
building blocks connect the central processing unit and the
random access memory to form self-checking computer
modules that can detect their own internal faults during
normal operation. The self-checking computer modules
contain interfaces to a set of redundant intercommunication
buses and can be connected into a network in which spare
computers are employed for fault recovery.
A breadboard of the Building Block Fault-Tolerant Com-
puter is currently being developed, and it is expected that it
will be completed and verified in 1982. Flight availability will
require the subsequent development of two VLSI and four LSI
integrated circuits, and will take an additional two or three
years. The problem of obtaining radiation hard parts is com-
mon to both the Fault-Tolerant Spaceborne Computer and the
Building Block Fault-Tolerant Computer programs.
B. Fault-Tolerant Avionics Computers
Two avionics computers were presented. These machines
have been developed by NASA for control of luture fuel-
efficient aircraft that will be d,_,nanlically unstable. Extremely
high reliability is required since lives may depend on correct
computer operation. Thus a reliability of 0.999999999 is
required for every lO-htJur lhght mission. These avionics
_omputers are nt)t directly appll_.able to spacecraft. Weight.
pov, er. and volume greatl_ exceed what can be supported by a
spacecralt. The) are also designed to alloy, human ,nainten-
ante after every IO-hour flLght when the plane ts on the
ground a condltton not experienced by :,pacecraft.
The two avaomcs computers are designated Fault-Tolerant
Malt|processor and Software Implemented Fault Tolerance
Both have been developed as breadboard systems and are
currently under test. Though not immediately applicable to
spacecraft, many of the techniques and insights developed in
their design will be applicable to long-term mearch into future
ASM systems. These machines are summarized below.
1. Fmdt-TolkmrMt Mul_. The Fault-Tolerant
Multiproceuor is intended for use as one of at least two
central computers in --. redundant distributed digital system
designed to serve as a highly survivable avionics system. The
design is based on independent processor-cache memory
modules and common memory modules that communicate via
redundant serial buses. All information processing and trans-
mission is conducted in triplicate so that local voters in each
module can correct errors. Modules can be retired and/or
reassigned in any configuration. Reconfiguration is carried out
routinely from second to second to search for latent faults in
the voting and reconfignration elements. Job assignments
are all made on a floating basis, so that any processor triad is
eligible to execute any job step. The core software in the
Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor will handle all fault detection,
diagnosis, and recovery in such a way that applications pro-
grams do not need to be involved (Ref. 6).
2. Software Implemented Fault Tolerance. Software Imple-
mented Fault Tolerance is an ultrareliable computer for
critical aircraft control applications that achieves fault toler-
ance by the replication of tasks among processing units. The
main processing units are off-the-shelf minicomputers. Fault
isolation is achieved by using an individuaLly-buffered, serial
data link between each processor pair l'or all processors. Error
detection and analysis and system reconfiguration are per-
formed by software. Iterative tasks are redundantly executed,
and the results of each iteration are voted upon before being
used. Thus, any single failure in a processing unit or bus
can be tolerated with triplication or quintuplication of tasks,
and subsequent failures can be tolerated after reconfiguration.
The Software Implemented Fault Tolerance software is highly
structured and is formally specified using the SRl-developed
SPECIAL language IRef. 7).
C. Fault-Tolerant Cammerciei Computers
Three fault-tolerant computing projects at Carnegie Melh)n
Unlversit_ were presented. These systems use DEC minicom-
puters and are amLed at commercial applications. Though not
directly applicable to spacecraft systems+ some of tile insights
gained in their design are applicable to ASM research. These
machines, designated C.mmp. Cm*. and C.vmp. are summar-
ized below.
I. C.mmp. a multiminiprocessor. C mmp is a canomcal
multnprocessor system with a 16 × 16 crosspoint switch. Up to
tO
,,.;r
16 DEC PDP-II/40 processors may be connected to the
processor ports on the switch. The 16 memory ports provide
an address space m shared memory of 32 Mbytes. Any pro-
ceasor can access any of the 16 memory ports for memory
accesses. The entire set of processors may communicate via an
interprocessor bus that allows interprocessor interrupts at one
of four priority levels, continuously broadcasts a 60-bit
nonrepeating clock value, and allows any processor to HALT,
START, or CONTINUE any other processor (Ref. 8).
2. Cm*, a modular multi_. Cm* is a modular
muitiprocessor system based on the LSi-I ! processor. Each
computer module is connected via an interface to an intelli-
gent cluster controller. The clusters of computer modules can
be interconnected via intercluster buses. Each computer mod-
ule can share memory with any other computer module in the
network through routing tables in the cluster controller
(Ref. 8).
3. C.vmp, a voted multiprocessor. C.vmp may best be
described as a multiprocessor system capable of fault-tolerant
operation. It consists ot three separate LSI-I I microcomputers.
each with its own memory and peripherals. They may run
mdependently as three separate computers communicating
through parallel line units, or they may be switched into what
is termed voling inode under manual or program control to
form a triplicated LSi-i I. This form of triple-modular redun-
danc_ allows the voted multtprocessor to continue operating
under the situation where an> one out of three copies of all}'
triplicated element suffers a hard failure (Ref. 8 _.
III. State-of-the-Art Technology Asmmsment
In thzs ,;ect,_n an assessment will be made of the applic-
abllit,, tel the currerlt sp,lcectalt ..llltt tatllt-tolerant ,..'twllptlter
tcchnol,,_,3, t,, an ASM+e,ha,ced +',pacectaft In general, design
teattJle+ ,,viii need to be added tt_ the spacecraft to accomplish
the nev, tuner,ms dictated hx ASM. The procurement/
trlanagement pohctes are constdexed adequate for ASM. but
new de_tgn tool,,, rehat_tlit_ techniques, and testJ_,'ahdatton
pr,_,cdure_ v,dl be tequnred.
A. Spacecraft Technology ,Im_mlm_m!
,X._ indl_.ttcd It_ tt_e mtr,,Jt,_,:,,tl. ASM consists ,)t spa,c-
or,it! ,le_|t:ll', that tolerate ladt_tc_, and that require tlo grotlt|d
_.tqllact mter.i,.tt,_n tot extended pe+tt)ds ol time lhe tolJt+w-
II|_ ,l_+_.e'_t_lllgl|| _t" #tlllent h2chlh)log,_, IS gl¥Cll agalll_.t these
,II t l Ibtlle_,
I. lk,+ign fealurrs In each t)l the pre_,entalton., there _,ere
,,e_.efal n|eth,,ds ol lauh detect,re, t,,,,lal,m, and recover_ thai
were common to all the spacecraft. The methods utilized in
the design and implementation have evolved in parallel with
the spacecraft requirements, ha requirements for long life and
high reliability have become more stringent, specialized
functions have evolved, with satisfactory in-flight experience
serving as the basis for broad acceptance. Typical of the
specialized techniques employed by spacecraft to protect
against specific fault classes are: cr0em-strappiqg, voters, watch-
dog timers, parity checks, data coding, counters, and switching
networks. These fault-handling techniques pertain generally to
subsystems. At the system level, about all that is currently
done in a fault situation is to put the spacecraft in a safe-hold
mode to await ground-operator command. It is the inclusion
of onboard detection, isolation, and recovery mechanisms for
the purpose of reducing 'all ground interaction that is the
distinguishing characteristic of ASM.
a. Detection mechanisms. Present spacecraft design tech-
niques rely on parametric data telemetered to ground
operators for fault detection. Generally, faults are inferred
from the nonre'al-time analysis of such data. However, ASM
requires the timely detection of fadts by either direct para-
metric measurement or incipient fault prediction using direct
measurement and onboard trend analysis techniques. Because
of mass and power constraints, measurement technology
beconles a leading technoh)gy driver. More extensive use of
watchdog timers, parity checks, error-coding schemes, and
counters is anticipated. Concerns about the integrity of
detection mechanisms, utilizing special test routines and/or
additional detection mecha!ltsms must also be resolved.
h. Isolation mechanisms. Extremely high reliability switch-
mg techniques dominate fault isolation strategies, which
revolve the ability to remove faulty components from the
system p_ior to reestablishing a "fault.free", fully operational
configurathm. At issue is the reliability of the switching
n+echanisms themselves. Redundant switching strategies,
power conlrol, and special test routines to assess switch
integrity, during latent intervals are required.
<' /_et'+)vt,r). mechanisms. Recovery n+echanisms tend to
center upon i:_sues of resource management and techniques Io
II|,IXlIIli/C S)_itC(ll pertormance subset|uent to l'aults. As such,
the_. teple'.,enl a s_y, leln atlrlbtile, _,hereas detection and
t-.dat.m mechaiHsnls :ire characterized as subsystem attributes.
A ,.,,stem-level vtem of 1he available spacecraft resources
v.lll be needed, and ,,o _,ystem trade-olf studies StllVil|g to
llllllltlll/e Ct'._l (lllaS:_, voh:,ne, power)and rnaxilrlite recovery
potential from lault+s ate requ|red
2. Spacecraft methodologies. In general, the procurement
managen)ent pohcleS have been considered adequate by the
stud), participants: however, new design procedures are anticl-
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pated.Thefollowingdiscussionfocusesontheneedfornew
designtoolsandnewtestandvalidationprocedures.
a. Des_,n took. Simulaton and emulaton will be required
to provide relative assessments of the design and to assist in
trade-off evaluations. Present reliability methods, however, as
defined by MIL-HDBK-217 may not be directly applicable to
ASM Areas requiring further study include:
(1) Software and firmware reliability. The problem in-
creases with the complexity of the software, and total
project orientation is needed for success.
(2) Predictive methodology for transient failure analysis.
Test data on commercial computer systems presented
during this study indicate that as many as 50% to 90%
of reported failures result from transient faults.
b. Testing. The present testing techniques have been shown
to be adequate for current spacecraft. For an ASM spacecraft.
however, new testing methods may be required because
{l) testing of ASM functions must be done at each step in the
integration process: (2) new onboard capabilities may require
new test equipment: and (3) the possibility of ASM masking a
failure prior to launch must be detected.
c. Validation. A major element of validation, specifically
relevant to ASM, is reliability validation. As noted at a NASA
conference on validation methods research for fault-tolerant
avionics and control systems (Ref. 9):
"'A tradition',d approach to reliability v',didation is
the lifetesting method in which one takes n
statistically identical copies of the system under
test and terminates the test after r (I _ r _ n)
systems have failed. Using the accumulated time
on test, one can derive a point estimate and con-
fidence intervals for the mean life of the system.
These statistical techniques also allow one to cal-
culate confidence intervals fur system reliability
for an)' given mission time."
". .... the number of systems required to be put
under test increases monotonically with the reli-
abihty of the system being tested. Furthermore.
the validation probler.I ts compounded because the
cost of an individu,l] copy of the system als,
increases remarkably with its reliability.'"
". .... applying traditional lifetesting techniques
tmphes unreasonably high validation costs."
The conclusion ,)f the NASA workshop is that a new valida-
tion methodology zs required fi_r fault-tolerant avionics and
control systems. This conclusion is also appropriate for long-
rived, highly reliable spacecraft systems.
El. Fauit-Toilera_ Compulilng Te_hwmilogw AmmammeM
The following conclusions summarize the state of the art
in fault-tolerant onboard computers, and the applicability of
extending the methodology of fault-tolerant computing to
ASM.
I. Machine availability. No fault-tolerant computers are
currently available for use on ASM spacecraft. The Air Force's
Fault-Tolerant Spaceborne Computer is the most viable candi-
date for use in a 1985 ASM demonstration, since it is the only
fault-tolerant onboard processor in an advanced state of devel-
opment. A breadboard has been constructed and verified. The
major obstacle to its use is the development of low-power.
radiation-hardened LSI. This is an enabling techtaology for all
advanced digital systems in USAF spacecraft and is being
treated as a problem of high priority and urgency.
The Fault.Tolerant Spaceborne Computer may be ham-
pered, however, because it is implemented as a tingle uni-
processor. It is expected that future spacecraft architectures
will tend toward a proliferation of small microcomputers in
a variety of control and payload subsystems. Fault tolerance
will need to be distributed throughout these distributed
architectures (e,g., special fault-detection hardware will be
required in each small subsystem computer), and a hierarchy
of recovery mechanisms wil] be employed. Therefore it is
m_portant that fault-tolerant distributed computing systems
be developed fl_r future generations of ASM spacecraft. The
Building Block Fault-Tolerant Computer is a distributed
computing system being developed toward that objective, it
is not as far advanced in development as is the Fault-Tolerant
Spacebome Computer, but it may be available as an alterna-
tive flight system in the future.
2. Fault-tolerance methodology. Many of the techniques
employed in fault.tolerant computer design can be extended
beyond the computing subsystems to the ASM spacecraft
system. This has already been demonstrated to a considerable
extent ten years ago in an ASM study of the NASA Thermo-
electric Outer Planets Spacecraft IRef. 10). S_,ne of the fault-
toleraot computing methodologies that can be applied to
spacecraft are listed bel,w:
11) Cart,]id delblithm of fault sct: In both digital and
spacecraft systems, it is necessary to carefully define
and analyze th," fault conditions.
12) I,'ault.dctccthm algorithms: Following a careful anal-
ysis of faults, it is necessary t,, determine the n)echa.
nisms by which they are detected. In both digit',d and
t2
a_
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nondig/tal subsystems, th/s takes the form of special
sensing hardware and software.
(3) Fault containment: To simplify fault recovery, in both
computers and spacecraft, it is necessary to design the
system so that the spread of damage caused by a fault
is minimized. Whenever po_ible, it is advantageous
to detect and contain faults at the lowest possible
level.
(4) Hierarchic fault recovery: Fault detection and recovery
in computers is done in a hierarchic fashion. Recovery
may be implemented at various system levels depend-
ing upon the origin and severity of the fault. This meth-
odology clearly applies to spacecraft systems as well.
(5) Reliability modeling: Reliability and performance
models developed for fault-tolerant computers are
applicable to ASM spacecraft. The concept of "cov-
erage", which describes the effectiveness of the fault
recovery, nlechanisms, is very important in both com-
puter and spacecraft systems. Extensions of existing
reliability and performance models for computers are
recommended for spacecraft evaluation.
_6) |'alidathm: Current work on the validation of fauh.
tolerant computers will be applicable to spacecraft
s_stems. Fault-tolerant computers and ASM design
should make it much easier to verify the integrity of
the fault recover._ nlechanisms without inserting fauhs
into the system. Techniques for and results of experi-
mental testing of fault-tolerant computers wtll be of
considerable value to ASM spaceclaft engineers.
(7) Resource mana_ment: in complex computing systems
and in spacecraft there is a resource rt_z_ement prob-
lem associated with fault recovery. As an attrition of
resources occurs due to faults, the system must op-
timally allocate those resources remaining.
IV. Sumnmp/ 
Reduction of space system vulnerability can be achieved
by moving the control/operations center functions on board
the spacecraft. To do this, an autonomous spacecraft mainte-
nance capability is required that _1) incorporates design
features that permit the spacecraft to tolerate faults and
1,2_ eliminates the need for routine ground contact. The mili-
tary spacecraft are currently designed t\_r ground-controlled
maintenance, and in terms of the ASM capabilities described
above, they cannot now autonomously maintain their own
health and welfare. The planetary spacecraft described are
a step closer to the goal. but are not there themselves. Thus.
althou_ some pioneering work m ASM has been done, it is
still in its infancy, in addition to the enhancement of the cur-
rent capabilities that have already been mentioned, the study
group foresees two major technological developments that are
needed to enable ASM. These are _1 _ a fault-tolerant data
processing system and (2) an autonomous navigation capa-
bility (to reduce the dependence on the control/operations
center). The study group is unanimous m its assessment that.
with these developments, the ASM capability can be made
available.
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The ASM-Enhanced System
I. Candidate Design Requirements
Concurrent with the state-of-the-art spacecraft system and
fault-tolerant computer assessments, the study group deter-
mined a set of ASM system requirements to convey ASM
attributes, so that a spacecraft concept could be established.
The inlp-,ct of these requirements on fUttlre Air Force space-
,:raft s_,stems was then analy/ed, Following are the candidate
conceptual design requtrenlents de,.'eloped from this study.
t !, .-Ill Air k'_ ,rcc sa,acecra]? laun('ht_l a/'tt'r 31arch 198','
_hall Ptlt't'l lilt' AS, If n'quircnlt'nts listed bel_,w On
th_s date. the Department of ik.fense _,otlld require
all subsequent spacecraft purchased to include the
fuU_ olx'tatlonal ASM ,:apabtltt._,
IPrtot to thl.,,date, tt ts desirable to add incremental
ASM c.,pabthttes, consistent with s_stem pertor-
matlce, as the_ are developed )
I "-) D_t' ..I S If spacet'ra]t shall t_pcrah" with, ,**t a gn )url, l
sul,pt,rt c, _nt_,l link ]i,r up t, _ 60 ,lays with_ mt dcgra.
,lation _q pcr]_ _rtnanc(" This is the essertce of autono.
lnou$ operatlt)ns The spacecraft v.tll fun,:tton until
ground support ts available or desirable from the
vlev, pol,t of the ground support teanl,
O)
q4)
The ASM spacecraft shall operate with nor mort" than
10_ degradathm of key functhms orer a 6-month
period o]" autonomy. This requirement will set sorne
sizing constraints, such as data storage, and require
some definition of loss of performance. It stresses
the need for continuous function of the spacecraft
on an "'ad hoe" basis if scheduled ground support is
not provided. The 10% figure is somewhat arbitrary:
however, a_ the end of 6 months, the performance of
the entire system shall be at a useful level.
/'he .4XI,! sl,a,'e('ra]? shall interact with the .enmrld
$1,pporl /t'g,_Ht'tlf Ji)r no/ mort' fhal'l t)0 ?HDIIIIt'S It)
t,crJor,_ all rc,luirt',l support /io! "liOns withot_t per-
Ji_r, lattt't" dcgradation After a period of autotlonly.
it Is requ|red that the spacecraft and ground support
perfortn all the required support functions m tlus
_,mdo,_,. rhe functions include Is) downhnk of all
stored malntet_ance history,. (b) uphnk t)f all data
load (such as star tables and ephemeris). (c) redun-
dant) management, and (d) testing. Specification of
the duration of the support window is mission
dependent. The intent would be an uphnk support
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(5)
(6)
period approximately the same as that required for
non-ASM spacecraft.
ASM shall not change the design filet/me of the
spacecraft. The imposition of the requirement for
ASM on a spacecraft development is in addition to
mission-imposed requirements, particularly the design
lifetime. ASM will impact the design methodologies.
Such design issues as depth of redundancy must take
into account the rate at which resources are used up
with the ASM design so that the total lifetime or
mean mission duration shall not be reduced.
ASM shah not change the per/bnnance of the space-
craft or its payh_ad. All requirements placed upon
the spacecraft development for performance of
either spacecraft or payloads shall not be affected
by the presence of autonomous spacecraft mainte-
nance. The spacecraft must be designed to provide
these performance levels in tile absence of frequent
ground control interaction. Specific additional
spacecraft functiolls, such as navigation, may be
required to meet the autonomy requirement. If st).
tile performaz_ce of these functions (e.g.. navigation
accuracy) must support non-ASM system perfor-
mance requirements.
lhe .-IXIl spacecra.tt shall be able to recover from
]allures that have bccn defined a priori, attd the
pr_bability that any particular faill_re was dtTble,l a
photo S/lall bt' _ 0.98. The ASM functions include
monitoring tile spacecraft performance for faults and
problen_ _.,,mptoms, arid, in tile presence ota fauh.
identifying, is,_latmg, and mlplemcnting the recover2,'
mode at both subs>stem and s>stem levels. The a
priori analysis sh',dl be sufficiently complete that,
during the lifetime of the spacecraft, at least t}8_ of
the failures {e.g.. where some component has failed}
will be tdentilied m this manner {the coverage is
"_+_.) Comptmltd failures whereto muhiple symp-
tonl+ Of CUl slnlultalleousiy ol near simultaneously
during the detection and recovery period can be
exempted from thi_ requirement.
t.,,ll_,wotg latmch, tilt' .-IXII sl,acccra]t shall .t,o
thrc _t1.¢tl a pcri, _d <J.! <,tl-_,rbtt check, out and initiali:a-
tt, m ,,f+ tllcsame ,h+ratto_t us that o]a conlparabh,
tt,,tt...I,_'M spacccra]t lhe autonl_ln_, requirements
dt_cussed here ate apphed to the operattonal pertod
ut the spacecraft. _,htch is deemed tu begin ft_llownlg
the on-ot h t checkout period. In the ,.heckout period,
ntamlenance v, dl be unde_ ground cunttol, wtth
aatontlnlOtlS _,lpablhtles turned till or off as appro-
pirate Sntce the addltton of .-_,SM dries add certain
functions, operating modes, and complexities to the
spacecraft, these must also be checked out during the
same period. Following checkout, all autonomy
requirements will apply.
(9) The sFacecraft shall process and store all onboard
management data required for ground support, and
shall telemeter the data during the ground support
periods upon ground command. The capability _ali
handle all necessary data for 6 months. No matter
how confident designers may be of the maintenance
capability of the spacecraft, it will be necessary to
leave a record for ground support (an audit trail).
Without this information, the ground support func-
tion cannot evaluate the state of the spacecraft and
use the record of performance to extend the lifetime
of the spacecraft, develop or implement alternative
operating modes, or improve future designs.
(10) The ASM spacecraft shall transmit a message to the
ground at the first opportunity ]i_llowing any on-
board fault-management activity. Whenever an
incident occurs that requires maintenance activity in
response to failure symptoms, it is important that the
ground be given the opportunity to review the action
and to verify the status and mode of the spacecraft.
Thus. a telemetry message indicating that some
activity had taken place would be sent to the ground
at the first pass over an appropriate ground station.
This type of slgmd may be coded into the user data
to trigger an alarm at tile ground support station.
Sending of the message does not abolish the obliga-
tton of the spacecraft to retain the data for the
nlaximum period, and to continue to operate in an
autonomous manner for the established periods.
( I I ) The ground support shall be abh: to override ASM
managenlent activities lbr the system and the sub-
systems. While the ASM spacecraft shall have the
ability tt_ perform redundancy management in the
presence _1" an apparent fault or problenl, it iX neces-
sary that the ultimate control over these funt;tlons be
maintained at the ground, and that the spacecraft
shall allow for ground comnlunication that overrides
and ,:an reverse the prior dectstons of the ASM l'.:nc-
tions. _le capabilit_ is necessat_ su that the system
_,lll be able tu recuver from such learning curve
uncertainties as tntsdiagnosed prubletns ot design
ll.tws. III this _,';.ly. nonfatled components may be
reck, tied back into the cor_figuratttm inventory, t)r
the spacecraft ahernate modes of functitming may be
utth,,ed to make use of partial capabihties o| ct)nll_'_o-
nents. In terms of a hierarchical decision tree. the
ground support personnel shall occupy the top level
to rnaximize system perflmn;_.nce.
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(12) The source of last resort for fault isolation and recov-
ery shall be the ground rapport. The A_ spacecraft
shall be designed to recognize when it has been
unable to isolate, remove, and recover performance
following a fault. When this occurs, the spacecraft
shall take action to protect itself from self-injury or
dissipation of resources (such as an engine firing limit
cycle that would consume propellant), and await
ground intervention.
Satisfying these design requirements implies the movement
of the control of routine maintenance operations from the
ground to the spacecraft. The ground segment will assume a
supervisory role, always maintaining the ability to override
ASM actions, but allowing the spacecraft to initially handle
its own maintenance functions. The space segnlent, on the
other hand, will become more complex due to the added
operations it must perform, including onboard navigation
(eliminating the need for routine uplink) and fault detection,
isolation, and recovery. To handle these added operations, a
fault-tolerant data processing subsystem and an autonomous
navigation subsystem will be required. The major benefits of
ASM would then include: (i) reduced system vulnerability,
because it is no longer dependent upon the ground station
or possible incorrect comm:mds by human operators, and
(2) faster recovery from failures (seconds instead of hours or
possibly days) because recovery procedures would start
immediately upon fault detection.
II. Impact on the Ground and
Space Segments
Some examples of operations and maintenance thnctions
that presently are accomplished by the ground segment, but
with ASM will be accomplished by the spacecraft, include:
(!) Attitude/pointing commands
(2) Thermal control loop
(3) Power management
(4) Fault monitor/isolation
(5) Fault tolerant computation
(o) Fault switching
(7) l.oad switching
(8) Trend analysis
A reduction in ground control activity can clearly be seen. It
should be remembered, however, that in its supervisory
capacity, the ground segment will have the ultimate authority
and responsibility in all situations. As total reduction in
ground control will not occur at one time, a transition phase
will be required. This phase will enable: (1)inflight measure-
ments of effectiveness for ASM over a diverse set of operating
conditions, (2) the development of understandable and pre-
dictable ASM operations, and (3) simultaneous support of
both ASM and non-ASM operational spacecraft.
The increase in spacecraft autonomy will mean an increase
in the complexity of the spacecraft. While this increase in com.
plexity must not introduce catastrophic failures or reduce the
payload performance, it will tend to increase the spacecraft's
mass, power consumption, and total cost. Given the study
group's knowledge of current and projected technology, the
following heuristic estimates were established as reasonable
design goals for an ASM-enhanced spacecraft:
Power consumption: ASM < 10% of total
Mass impact: ASM < 5% of total
Cost impact: ASM < 10% of life-cycle
cost
III. A Hierarchical Description of the
Space Segment
The following sections describe what the study participants
believe will be the impact of ASM on a gener',dized spacecraft
system. In these descriptions, the following assumptions have
been made:
(1) The ASM requirement is added to a new spacecraft
before design.
(2) ASM technologies will be available.
(3) Payload is treated as a subsystem, except for user data
f] O_ ", .
(4) As long as lllJSSiOn ot.,jectives are met. normal space.
craft functions may be interrupted during certain fault
recovery procedures.
A. System Architecture
System architecture evolves from the mission requirements.
and includes the hardware organization, data flow charactens.
tics, and (if a digital system) the hierarchical operating s._stem.
]he system must judi,.:iousl), allocate the available resources
and, upon command, must report all ASM actions (il'lcluding
paramesric data) to the control/operations center. Finally, it
must also insure its o_,'n integrity (through self-diagnosis)st)
that incorrect actions and ground system lock-out modes are
eliminated.
Ira'
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An example of a system architecture that could be used for
ASM _ shown in Fig. 3. This is characterized by both distrib-
uted and central processing system attributes. Efficient man-
agement of the spacecraft resources based upon prespecified
algorithms require centralization of high-Iv ,el decision making.
This would be accomplished by a fault-tolerant processor,
serving as the spacecraft central controller, augmented by
processors located in each of the subsystems as appropriate.
In addition to the new subsystems already mentioned, the
architecture should also accommodate additional mission-
unique subsystems.
The system architecture example described above is one of
several possible architectures for an ASM spacecraft. While a
detailed investigation of the various architectures was not a
part of this study, the participants believe that such an effort
should be undertaken as one of the first tasks of an ASM
development program.
Whichever architecture is chosen, the study group believes
that a "layered" fault protection scheme should be used,
enabling fault containment at the lowest possible level to
minimize subsystem interdependencies resulting from fault
propagation (including data contamination). This fault pro-
tection scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4. In this scheme, individ.
ual subsystems, under system control, will diagnose local
failures and take corrective action. Ambiguous problems result-
ing Crom failures within the interfaces between subsystems
will require diagnostic routines and hardware to pin-point the
failure. Some unresolved system issues include the problems of
transients, false failure alarms, multiple faults, and faults
within the fault-tolerant computing system. Once the system
has been designed, test and validation procedures must be
ADDED
SUBSYSTEMS
N AV IGAT ION
SUBSYSTEM
l DATA
STORAGE
SUBSYSTEM
FAULT
TOLERANT
FA_OLT CENTRALCOMffi.IllER
JTOLERANT
t CENm_L JICOMmTER
1SOFTWARE
I NAVIGATION
J ICROPROCESSOR
• I
L_ PROC ESSIt,/G SUBSYSTEM
ASM MICROPROCESSORS
[
COMMUNICATIONS
MICROPROCESSOR
TELEMETRY AND
DATA HANDLING
MICROPROCESSOR
I
!f
I
I
I IL
I
I
ATTITUDE AND
ARTICULATION
CONTROL
MICROPROCESSOR
PROFIOLSION
MICROPROCESSOR
POWER
MICROPROCESSOR
PAYLOAD
MICROPROCESSOR
THERMAL CONTROL
MICROPROCESSOR
1
i(
I
L
ii----
t q
i I
t I
11 f
EXISTING
SUBSYSTEMS
COMMUNICATIONS
SUBSYSTEM
TELEMETRY AND
DATA HANDLING
SUBSYSTEM
ATTITUDE AND
ARTICULATIC)N
CONTROLSUBSYSTEM
PAOPULSION
SUBSYSTEM
POWER
SUBSYSTEM
PAY; OAD
SUBSYSTEM
THERMAL
CONTROL
SUBSYSTEM
Fig. 3. Exanq_ of a stream architecture for Aim epececrefl
17
$'ltStlM
SUBSYSTEM
MOOULE
FAULT
PRO11ECTION
LOGIC
i
t I
_NM _SPOhL_
i t
SENSE
FAULT
PROTECTION
LOG IC
RESPONSE
FAULT
PROTECTION
LOGIC
RESPONSE
Fig. 4. "l.lylmd" im:hllletiml of Mull I_
formulated. Finally, there should be a demonstration program
showing that the requirements for ASM are met without corn.
plomising either the mission lifetime or payload performance.
S.  ,a am
ASM will affect the traditional subsystems (attitude and
articulation control, power, telemetry and data handling,
payload, communications, propuhioa, amt thermal control)
by requiring that they add the capability of diagnosing and
handling their own faults. The conceptual design requirements
imposed on the ASM spacecraft, however, necessitate the
potential addition of two new subsystems. These include a
fault-tolerant data processing subsystem and an autonorno ts
navigation subsystem.
The need to integrate independent subsystems with tndi.
vidual processing requirements into a control hierarchy for the
purpose of managing and reporting fault-protection leads to a
requirement for a fault-tolerant data processing subsystem.
Because of the potential for power-interrupt failure modes,
this subsystem must include limited nonvolatile backup mem-
ory resources for selected critical program and data storage.
The requirement for six months of unattended operations
necessitates an autonomous navigation capability. The prob-
lems of vehicle position and velocity are dependent upon mis-
sion requirements for attitude control and pointing. It involves
the characterization (modeling) of complex gravitational
fields, including the effects of Earth figure and multibody
(Earth, Moon, Sun) interactions that perturb the vehicle posi-
tion and velocity. As attitude control requirements become
more stringent, more precise models and advanced sensors
permitting real-time drag acceleration measurements will be
requited to complement existing inertial measurement devices
and celestial sensors.
Finally, the requirements for a six-month audit trail and
onboard trend analysis to permit fault prediction and protec-
tion necessitates storage and manipulation of a large volume of
data. Without ground link3, the study participants believe
additional data storage _-apabilities, coupled through the data
network to the other spacecraft subsystems, will be needed.
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Implementation Plan
I. Introduction
This section, together with the Research Agenda of the
next section, describes the study participants' recommended
plan of attack to solve the problem that prompted the ASM
study: to satisfy the requirement for spacecraft readiness in
the face of the loss of ground stations, in contrast with the
Research Agenda that addresses medium- and long-range
academic research for an advanced ASM system of the 1990s,
this section focuses on the near-term (next five years) indus.
trial technology development and. most importantly, the
earliest possable system-level, proof-of-concept demonstration.
The plan stresses delivery of *'product" in a steady stream
from subsystems to a complete system for the System Program
Offices' consideration and introd,,ction into flight programs.
In this sense, the plan is a technology program that is managed
like a project, with fi)cused goals and milestones to he met.
While there is no provision tot a tlight demonstration in this
plan, a definite goal has been to provide a program that will
generate continuous ASM technology "fall-out,'" which can be
utilized in ongoing programs and in design block changes.
The program described below is preliminary: the limited
resources of the st.udy precluded a detailed program develop-
ment and cost estimate. However. the study participants feel
the proposed plan described contains the essentials of a
w_rkabie program needed to meel the futurerequirements
of the Asr Force.
A. Purpoee
The purpose of the plan is to recommend a coordinated set
of developments that will give industry a demonstrated capa-
bility to build an ASM spacecraft, and hence, enable the Air
Force to change from ground-dependent to autonomous
operational spacecraft by 1_)89.
B. G(xds
The goals of the plan are:
{1 ) To develop an ASM technology and apply it as early as
possible to existing programs, especially DMSP, DSP,
GPS, and DSCS i11.
(2) To develop, by 1985, a demons*rated industrial capa-
bility to produce autonomous spacecraft, so that the
first operational launch may take place by 1989.
C. AOIIxoaeh
The approach taken in preparing the plan can be summa-
rized in the following points:
(I) Involve as many relevant governmental and industrial
organizations as possible. This will create a broad base
of ASM experience, design, and methods.
I2) In support of the first goal. begin work with existing
subsystem designs: ASM implications and problems
(3)
must be characterized, designs and breadboards must
be modified, and results demonstrated early.
In support of the second goal, begin work on a parallel
system4evel analysis, desi_, and hardware program
leading to a proof-of-concept demonstration.
(4) Use as much available hardware as possible. Develop
and build as little new equipment as possible to meet
requirements. Acquire engineering teat models of
actual and/or representative aystemslaubsystems of Air
Force satellites.
(5) Focus on ASM.required changes only; design life and
performance advancements not needed for ASM should
not be pursued.
(6) Hold frequent reviews and conferences for technical
information exchange with 'all concerned industrial,
academic, and government organizations.
II. General Plan Description
The study participants recommend that the program con-
sist of four major elements, prefaced by a three-month start-up
period: first, an activity addressing existing programs at the
subsystem level, producing demonstration products within two
years; second, a system-level project addressing ASM-enhanced
Air Force programs with proof-of-concept in five years; third,
applications research directed at filling technological gaps; and
fourth, an advanced system development, aimed at the l q9Os,
to provide an opportunity for unconstrained research to
expand capabilities beyond the foreseeable future. These
elements are denoted as Tasks !, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The
advanced systems development, Task 4, is identified for com-
pleteness, but because its products would not meet the IttSq
launch requirement, resources are not identified. The Research
Agenda elaborates Task 4.
A general view of the plan is shown in Fig. I. in which the
arrows indica,e typic',d points t)f technology transfer between
tasks to the System Program Offices. All tasks start at the
beginning of CYSI to allow program definition and start-up to
take place ill tile first three months of FYSI. Task Its a
tw_-year activity tha! assesses increased fault detection,
isolation, and recovery fi)r existing subsystems. Design changes
will be made and breadboard units will be modified to test
ASM capabilities and benefits. Task 2 is a 5-year activity that
includes a top-down system development and the necessary
pew subs_,stem techno!ogy developments required for ASM. A
pre-phase A effort is required to prepare a prt_urement speci-
fication and to select the contractor fi_r both Task 2 and
Task 3. In Phase A. the mission r,'qutrements and spacecraft
design will he established, while in Phase B. the fabrication.
integration, test, and demonstration of the ASM system will
be performed. Task 3 is a five-year applications effort required
to develop new well.defined subsystem technologies. Task 4,
through CY$5, is performing the basic research for a "second-
generation" ASM system as mentioned earlier.
at. TreatmaaaCpeo 
The layout of the entire program is shown in more detail in
Fig. 5. in the view of the study participmta, the plan repre-
sents the best method of addressing the urgency of obtaining
an ASM readiness, given the available resources. The relative
times needed to accomplish the objectives are shown; reduced
funding or delays in program start-up will result in commen-
surate delays in completing the tasks described below.
A. Tmlk 1: Existing Suimystmn _ to A_d
The first task is a 24-month effort to characterize the sub-
systems involved with ASM, redesign the breadboards, check-
out subsystem ASM functions, and provide measures of
capability required to accommodate ASM. These measures will
be in such terms as memory size and throughput. Because the
subsystems are well known, it is felt that modifying them to
include ASM features will be the quickest and most cost-
effective way to size the challenge early and to incorporate
some ASM capability into the spacecraft. When successfully
demonstrated, the System Program Offices could consider
them for operational use.
It is expected that mu_,h of the design work, and perhaps
the breadboards, would be important to the Task 2 effort,
and heavy interaction between tasks should be anticipated.
The subsystems to be studied are {ranked by their ASM
importance): attitude and articulation control, power, telem-
etry and data handling {including tape recorders), payload,
communications, propulsion, and thermal control. Structure
and mechanical devices are not included because their design
is little imp:'-cted by ASM requiremenls. It is recommended
thal two contractors perform on each subsystem tt_ gain a
diversity of experience for contractor and program appbca-
tion. As no two designs :,re the same, additional int\_rmation
will be gamed from this approach to broaden the data base.
The first six months is spent on design study. Tile _uhsys.
fern's fault characteristics will be examined, and the t'auh
detection, isolation, and recovery techniques will be devel-
oped. The hierarchical assignment of fault recovery betgeen
faults totally handled within the subsystem and those "passed
on" to the system for acuon, will be developed. Evaluation ol
the reliability of sensors and switching, which are essential to
"'error free" ASM, wdl be done. Changes m design techniques.
instrumentation, and associated software or firmware as well
10
MILESTONES
li
:l MISSION, O_1_.RATI(_IS 4,AND SPACECRAFT REQUIREMENTS
-_ ASM_ mS_N
'-'l sys_M OOCU_mATmON ANO TEST_-QUmE_NTS
_'I su,_-rtMm_D,o_,,oFA.K:A,ON_,.ST
_ TEST FACILITY PREPARATION
"_ SYSTEM INTEGRATION
_[ PROOF OF CONCEPT TEST
_ITASK 3: APPLICATIONS RESEARCH
"I CONCEPTUAL DESK3N "
_ E,_EADIOARD AND TEST
_[ PROTOTYPE AND QUALIFY
TASK I: EXISTING SUISYSTEMS TO ASM
DESIGN STUDIES
D_AILEO D_SIGN
MOOIFY IIIEADIOARDS/SUPPORTEQUIPMENT
CL_.K+OutLm_............
TASK 2: ASM SYSTEM DEMOI_STRATION
REVIEWS
"'1 TECHNICAL EXCHAI_IGE CO#qFERENCE
- TASK 4: ADVANCED SYSTEM DEVELOPMENTSUPPORTING BASK: RESEARCH
CYII CY_ CYI_ CYII4 CYI CVl_
,SUISYSTIM
_tl SYSTEMTEST-
! • t " ACCEPTANCE REVIEw;
Fig. S. Autonomous q)ac_raft maintenance program
as the hardware will be covered. An assessment will be made as
to what benefits accrue in reduced ground maintenance with
the recommended ASM capabilities in the subsystems. In the
next nine-month period, detailed design takes place. Mgo-
rithms for ASM will be defined, coded, and debugged. Hard-
ware modifications and softv,'are changes will be made. ASM
design features may be implemented in single-string fashion so
that in this exercise only the subsystem under test will be fault
tolerant.
in the last )'ear of the program, the breadboards or engi-
neering test models and associated support equipment will be
modified to include the ASM features, and then tested. The
testing will be a rigorous exercising of the fault-processing
logic by m lection of all t_ pes u_ faults. The testing will provide
specific valid measures of ASM pertormance and design
requirements in such terms as memot 3 requirements, speed,
and reck,very algt_rithms, which can be tlt|lized by various pro-
gram office., as apprt_pt_a tem their ,mgoing or new programs.
At the conclusion of Task 1. impacts uf ASM will be clearly
established Fault charicter _tll be understoodl new sensor
and s_ltching technolo_3 wdl emerge: soft,,are and hardware
v,lll be sized to do the job : algorithms for handling faults will
be checked out, man) s)stem issues will be discovered for
resolut:un m Task 2. and finall), the" System Prosram Offices
_tll have an opportumt) to assess ASM appllcabilit) at the
subsystem level
B. Task 2: ASM System Demonstration
This second recommended task is a five.year activity that
ends in a system-level demonstration of ASM. It is laid out
very much as a typical flight project might be, but truncated at
the system test of a prototype spacecraft with no flight hard-
ware built. Th_ assumption is made that the system demon-
stration will be achieved by applying ASM to one mission,
such as DSP. DMSP. or GPS, but the extension of this ASM
technology to ",ill Air Force missions will be an active design
consideration, l'he reviews are typical, with only the System
Test Requirements and the Proof-of-Concept Acceptance
Revieu, s being unique to this program. The phases are typical
as well: systems an',dys_s and requtremet_t_ generatiun: system
design: subsystem design, fabrication, and test: and sy._tem
integration and test.
The analysis and requirements activity proceeds during the
second .,eat and culminate_ at the Preliminar3, Design Reviev,
_,ith the prt)ductmn uf the Mission and Systeln Requirements
document. The activity includes tni_,sh)nimpacts, recovery
strategy, degradatttm profiles, and data return strateg_ as
faults t)ccur: reliabilit) and r_sk analyses: operatton an;dysis
with ASM: flid+t:ground tradeoff+: spacecraft system lauh
analysts develupment t>f the "'layered" h_ult protection s):,tent
architecture, fault detectiun. Isolation. arid recovery at the s) s-
tern level: payh,ad interaction with ASM: and in-flight naviga-
tion requirements gerteration.
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The ASM system design occurs during the second and third
year, culminating at the Critical Design Review. The design
team will study alternate design approaches; allocate functions
between hardware, firmware, and software; study distributed
vs central computing; analyze performance; write specifica-
tions; and have the usual heavy system/subsystem interaction
on design (including Task 1 personnel). The key product will
be the Spacecraft System Specification, available at the Criti.
cad Design Review. Another important part of this U,,riod is
the system te._t requirements to be imposed. The design must
allow access for fault injections during test, which may not be
easy to implement. The System Test Requirements Review
will address adequacy of testing to prove that ASM has a
night-ready capability.
The fourth and fifth years of the ASM system activity will
be used to redesign, fabricate, and test the subsystems, and
then integrate them and test the system for proof of concept.
Where possible, the subsystems from Task 1 will be used, but
modifications will still have to be made to integrate them into
the overall system design. Redesign, fabrication, and test
should take 1_< months. The subsystems will be delivered to
system test at 51 months into the project.
The test facility preparation starts at the beginning of the
fourth year, and must be completed by subsystem delivery.
Support equipment must be designed or modified as needed.
It must be determined how the fault injection and testing will
be done for proof-of-concept testing. In addition to the differ-
ent states that the facility will have to test, it must also be able
to simulate the power source, thrusters, spacecraft dynamics,
and mechanical ]evices.
Finally, system integration begins at 48 months, and proof-
of-concept testing begins at 54 months. The system-level proof
of concept will be a full electrical demonstration of the ASM
system, under the test conditions already mentioned. Testing
will be performed in a laboratory ambient environment.
Throughout the program, attention _ll be paid to any
spacecraft block changes to ongoing programs that may pro.
vide an early opportunity for ASM application. Block changes
will not necessarily affect the ASM system demonstration
project, but if one occurs at an opportune time, some of the
system development may be directed toward it.
]'he Proof-of-Concept Acceptance Review is the final mile-
stone in the system activity. Test results would be examined
for vahdity and completeness, and if the review is success-
ful, ASM will be demonstrated as a viable, implementable
technology.
C. Ttak 3: Applettlms Ikmeeh
Task 3 is a new technology research and development
activity of five years duration that addresses known gaps at
the subsystem level. Two are currently identified: a dis-
tributed fault-tolerant data processor with a nonvolatile com-
puter backup memory, and an autonomous navigation sub-
system. Figure 5 shows the development schedule for these
items, it is expected that the breadboards for these subsystems
would be used in the system proof of concept. If not avail-
able, appropriate simulators/emulators would have to be
provided. Resources for in-flight navigation are not included
here because it is assumed that currently-funded programs
elsewhere can be expected to produce the needed breadboard
in 1983.
D. Task 4: Advanced ASM System Development
As mentioned earlier, this effort is comprised of the Re-
search Agenda of the next section. The products of that
research will fold into the "second-generation" ASM system of
the 1990s.
E. Program Cost Estimate
A budgetary cost estimate for Tasks 1,2, and 3 is shown in
Table 7. This does not include funds for the developmen, of
the autonomous navigation capability, which is assumed to be
handled in another program. These figures should be con-
sidered only an estimate for several reasons. First, the cost of
developing the new technology is not well known. Second, a
specific mission application has not been assumed, and so
candidate spacecraft could not be assumed. Finally, substanti-
ating data was not provided by the individual participants.
For these reasons, a more definitive cost study should be per-
formed in the initial phases of the activity.
IV. Summary
The Implementation Plan presented here, in the view of the
study participants, represents a balanced, focused attack on
the Air Force's spacecraft maintenance problems. System. sub-
system, and new technology elements are all pursued at a level
sized to the difficulty of the specific ASM challenge while
recognizing the needs for early demonstrable results for on-
going operational programs. The above described implementa-
tton plan is recommended by study participants as the basis
for the Air Force's ASM program.
Table 7. /UMll I_rogmm mlmKee _
_oiKam retout_-es, $k s
Task I_ogzam element CYgl C¥82 CYB3 CY84 CYES Totals
I Existing subsystems b 2.900 3,500 dO0 7,200
redesign to ASM
2 ASM system des_n c S00 4.500 7.500 7,500 3,000 23,000
and demonstration
3 Applications research 5UO 800 1,300 2.300 1,200 6.200
Totals 4,000 8,800 9,600 9,800 4,200 36,400
aContractt_r _;o_t_ only. AF pro¢'urement and management costs not included; autonomous navigation development not included.
F tfure_ are i' _80 dollar_
h [_,,L_,.ontractt_rs per sub_,_,stem assumed.
_'._injzl¢-,,_.,,ten1 contra_:tor a_umed
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Research Agenda
I. Introduction
A research program to support the development of auto-
mated spacecraft maintenance must focus on the most critical
problems expected in that development. A major challenge is
to channel a great deal of fault-tolerance expertise, developed
for other applications, into work that will specifically benefit
the space program. Fortunately, most of the ASM spacecraft
problems are shared by many other applications (e.g., process
control, avionics, and robotics) and are sufficiently general in
scope to be of considerable interest to the academic com-
munity. This proposed Research Agenda is organized around
specific spacecraft development problems. An underlying
cause of most of these problems is increasing complexity.
The basic motive force is rapidly expanding capabilities of LSI
and VLSI technosogy. Until very recently, satellites contained
a few hundred to a few thousand integrated circuits. Each
integrated circuit contained a few gates or registers, and the
collecthm of integrated circuits were combined to form a
system. We will soon fly single VLSI clups that contain thou-
sands of gates and memory cells such that each chip iS itself a
complex subsystem in a tiny package. This can result in an
enormous increase in functional capabilities iii satellites.
Onboard navigation, very-high-performance signal processing.
threat evasion, pattern recognition, and a host of other capa-
bilities will become feasible.
It is expected that fault tolerance will be an important
attribute of VLS! design because of the problems of transient
faults and testability. The very high complexity of large VLSI
systems is expected to result in transient faults every few
minutes, or every few hours. Current experience indicates a
transient error rate in LSI memory of one error per hour per
million bits. Even if this rate is reduced an order of magnitude,
impaired operation will occur unless the spacecraft system is
designed to detect and recover automatically from these fauh
conditions. The problem of thoroughly testing complex VLS!
circuits has only recently been recognized. Many existing
devices are essentially untestable and design faults are uncov.
ered in the field after prolonged usage. Since the only access to
a finished device is through a limited number of pins, it
becomes nearly impossible to exercise "all internal states of a
device containing thousands of transistors. Testable design
methodologies have been recognized as a high-priority research
problem in industry, and is even more critical for space appii.
cations.
New and largely unexplored problems are expected at the
system architecture level of space systems. Proliferation of
specialized microelectronlc controllers in spacecraft sub-
systems will lead to more complex cooperation between sub.
systems, between the spacecraft and ground, and perhaps
between different spacecraft. {'onsequently. the system
organization, software, and fault-tolerant aspects of space-
craft will have to become correspondingly more complex. A
hierarchy of computias processes is envisioned. This implies
more onboard monitoring circuitry to detect faults before
errors propagate through the system, making diagnosis and
recovery extremely difficult. Automatic trend analysis may be
employed to record and discover new error patterns, and
heuristic recovery algorithms may be required to recover from
unanticipated faults.
in summary, there exist a variety of research areas that are
rich in both substance and appficability, and are essential to
the development of future space systems.
II. Research Plan
Recognizing that resources are limited, the following re-
search plan is broken into five areas that are essential to future
ASM development: (I) VLS! technology, (2)architecture of
advanced ASM systems, (3) software fault tolerance, (4) mod-
elin b and analysis, and (5) supporting development. In terms
of criticality, they are listed in descending order. Subsystem
technology and especially related VLSI issues must be resolved
no matter what architecture is chosen. An understanding of
system architecture is necessary to make modeling and analysis
more useful and relevant.
A. VLSl Technology
Testing of LS! devices is a serious and expensive problem
in current spacecraft. It will be a critical issue in ASM systems
because it is necessary to detect faults very quickly after their
occurrence, so that autonomous recovery mechanisms can
restore the spacecraft to normal operation with minimal dis-
ruption of performance. This research area has two compo-
nents: ( i ) self-testing VLSI, and (2) on-chip redundancy.
I. Self-testing VLSi. The first goal of this component is
to develop methodologies to design VLS! chips that are
( ! ) thoroughly testable prior to normal operation, and (2) self-
checking. A methodology for designing self-checking circuitry
has been developed that allows the chip to detect internal
faults concurrent with normal operation. We must learn to
design a chip that will be tully exercised and tested during
normal operation. Even it we can detect a fault when it occurs,
it may be months or )ears before a complex chip in normal
operation enters a fauhy state. Thus. development of"easily'"
testable circuits is a high-priority research item.
2. On.chip redundancy. A second goal of this research ts to
mvesttgate the use of on-chip redundancy to tmpro_'e yield and
clup rellabdtu,. Although the existence of catastrophic failure
modes make it necessary to back up individual c|ups with
spares, the use of on-chip redundancy may greatly improve
chip reliability and system life.
s.
This area includes the hardware and software organization
to achieve fault tolerance in highly complex ASM spacecraft.
This work must take into account the trend toward prolifera-
tion of computers in spacecraft subsystems, and it should be
directed toward future space systems in which dozens of dis-
tributed computers may be used. it should address the impacts
of VLSI in spacecraft architecture, performance, and ASM
capability. It is expected to support ASM spacecraft develop-
meat beyond 1990.
To effectively involve the academic community it, space-
craft system research, it will probably be necessary for the
USAF to develop a set of strawman system requirements.
Most members of the academic community are not familiar
with the unique problems of space systems (e.g., power,
weight, volume, uplink and downlink, instruments, testability,
command interfaces, and subsystem operation). Thus careful
problem definition is required to focus this work toward real
space problems. Such strawman systems might include a robot
for in-space assembly, or a satellite that must correlate and
make decisions on multiple sensor inputs.
The following architectural tasks are highly interrelated
(e.g., hardware and operating systems studies), and mechanisms
for frequent interchange of information between groups work-
ing in this area are very important. A series of workshops might
be one such mechanism.
The following tasks have been identified: (I)organization
studies, (2) operating systems for large hierarchic space sys-
tems, (3) recovery by problem solving. (4) fault tolerance
in very-high-performance processors, 15) architecture
des_qopment.
Underlying Tasks I. 2, and 3 is the need to develop a hier-
archic model of complex distributed functions in ASM space-
craft, and models of the interfaces between ,_pacecraft sub;ys-
terns. Computing in each spacecraft subsystem generates .'t
"'virtual" digital interface between the subsystem and the
spacecraft system. Models of these mterfaces should include
generalized fault monitoring and recovery functions at each
level of the hierarchy. Such models may lead to insights on
how to structure these intelfaces It) unprove software reliabd-
it',', and fault recovery, as well as simplified commandmg :md
s} stern integration.
I. Oqlanization studies. These studies will include postu-
lating fault.tolerant distributed, and hierarchical computer
architectures ahmg with communication fl)rmats, and software
aS
executivestructuresthatareapplicable.Thefirstgoalof this
componentis to performtradeoffsandpinpointhe relative
capabilities and limitations of the postulated architectures
with respect to spacecraft performance and fault tolerance.
The second goal is to develop specific fault-tolerance tech-
niques for use in these types of systems. Among the fault-
tolerance questions to be addressed arc:
(1) How can reliable clocking and synchronization be
carried out between the multiple processors?
(2) How can embedded processors with their numerous
input/output pins be spared?
(3) How can nonhomogeneous specialized processors be
handled, especially when fault-tolerant architectures
are biased towards a homogeneous pool of processors?
(4) How is executive software organized to support re-
covery, rollback, and diagnosis?
(5) Can the system be designed to tolerate software errors
through fault-containment?
(6) How does one design virtual interfaces that partition
software between various computer modules?
(7) How is redundancy distributed? What fault detection
is provided at the various sensor/actuator levels within
the computer, subsystem, and system levels? What
are the levels of sparing employed on chips, between
chips, and between subsystems?
(8) How well can fault-tolerance features be made trans-
parent to the user?
2. Operating systems for large hierarchic space systems.
This research is directed at developing operating system con-
cepts best suited to complex distributed systems. Issues to be
addressed are:
{I) Hierarchical partitioning of executive functions -
global/local.
(2) Effect of 'alternative executive structures on applica-
tion software reliability, testability, and fault-
containment.
(3) Interaction of executive with hardware and software
fauh-toleranc_ mechanisms.
(4) Provability of correctness of the execut,ve.
15) Robustness the ability of the operating system to
survive errors in applications software.
3. Recovery by problem solving. Many of the techmques of
artlficlal intelligence and problem solving may be :,ppllcable in
dealing with unanticipated fault conditions, or with operator
errors. This task is intended to develop heuristic techniques to
deal with this class of unexpected faults and possibly
some errors.
4. Fault-tolerant high-performance processors. This area
includes the processors that will be or are being developed
(e.g., signal processors). Techniques to achieve fault detection
and recovery, and also to integrate such systems in ASM satel-
lites, require investigation. This is especially true because many
of these systems will probably not work without embedded
fault tolerance due to a high transient error rate brought on by
enormous complexity.
5. Architecture development. To use ASM in a satellite,
the supporting technology must be in place. Project offices
are usually in no position to accept the delay and risk of
developing new technology. Thus, this research program
should develop one or more fault-tolerant computer system
architectures to at least the breadboard stage. Fault-tolerant
architectures are sufficiently complex that it is necessary to
build and test them to understand their behavior, it is expected
that the selection and design of these architectures would be
outgrowths of current architecture developments (Software
Implemented Fault Tolerance, Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor,
Fault-Tolerant Spaceborne Computer, and Building Block
Fault-Tolerant Computer), which would be heavily influenced
by the organization studies above.
C. ,_tlt_mre Fault Tolerance
This research area is concerned with developing reliable
software for distributed computer systems for ASM space-
craft. It includes three areas of study: (1)system partitioning
and interface definition to improve software reliability,
(2) self-checking flight software, and (3) fault-tolerant
software.
i. Partitioning and interface definition. This task is tightly
coupled with the architecture studies. The partitioning of
functions within a distributed system and the virtLJal inter-
faces between subsystems have a very large impact on the
complexity and reliability of applications software. The goal
of this research is to study tradeoffs between alternate parti-
tioning and interface (command and data) definitions and their
impacts on software complexity and reliability. (Such issues as
the degree of system vs local control of a subsystem, timing
requirements on commands, acceptable communications
delays, scheduling strategy, and internal software structure,
are involved in these studies.)
2. Self-checking flight software. One go_ of this task is to
develop methodologies for detecting faults in applications
software as it is performing its normal operations. This in-
cludes the inclusion of acceptance tests in the flight programs
m
and a variety of other software fault detection mechanisms. A
second goal of this task is to develop verification and valida-
tion techniques, to prove the effectiveness of this self-checking
code.
3. Fault-Tolerant software. This task is intended to
develop techniques for developing software that operates in
the presence of programming errors. This is a difficult area that
involves the use of software fault detection and the execution
of redundant code to recover from design faults.
D. Modeling Imcl Analysis
In the development of advanced ASM spacecraft systems, it
is necessary to develop experimental testing techniques to
verify the effectiveness of the built-in fault-tolerance mecha-
nisms. Analytic statistical models that use these experimental
results and component failure rates are then required to pre-
dict the reliability and performability of the ASM spacecraft
as a function of time. This type of modeling is essential to
determine if a given spacecraft design will meet its objectives,
or to perform tradeoffs between competing design approaches.
A second class of tools r,,eeded in ASM development are
functional models and design languages that can facilitate
design and verification of ASM systems. Such tools could
provide the capability of specifying and simulating operations
of proposed systems, and 'allow changes and improvements
before a design is locked into hardware. A second important
use of design languages and functional models is to provide a
basis for formal verification of a design before launch, and
valid_:,ion of command sequences to an orbiting ASM
spacecraft.
The modeling and analysis area is broken into three compo-
nents: (I) experimental testing. (2) statistical modeling, and
(3) functional description, modeling, and verification.
I. Experimental testing. Spacecraft testing, already a dif-
ficuh problem, will become considerably more complex with
the introduction of ASM. A significant problem is how to
test these ftmctions that are dedicated to autonomous mainte-
nance. The g,,al of this component is to acquire a deeper
understa|_dtng of testing problems pecuhar t_) ASM. and
develop test generatn,m and test applicatitms methods fi_r
s_,lving these problems..A.n+t+ng the problems to be considered
that complicate testing are: II) testing at many levels in a
hterarch_. A21 the possibility ,._t"mauy o._mbinatt,.ms of input
eyelet>, and than,, unantncnpated faults. (3) the need to test m
an arttlic0at environment+ 14) wear.out phenomena, and
15) the deselopment ,_t specific tests reqmred by statistical
reliabihty models.
2. htintial moddinlg, l_obabilistic models of ASM space-
craft are needed to assess the probabilities of performing at
various levels, ranging from full performance to failure, over
the projected life of the spacecraft. Such models are being
developed, but have yet to be extended to complex, hetero-
genous spacecraft systems. The goal of this component is to
extend current methods, developed primarily for computer
applications, to accommodate additional complexities in
large, heterogeneous spacecraft systems. A considerable
advancement is required over existing models to deal with the
complexity resulting from dependent subsystem failures, and
the models must carefully relate to testing results as input
parameters. Special emphasis must be placed on modeling and
analysis of transient faults, since transients are expected to be
a major problem of VLSI technology.
3. Functional description, modeling, and verification.
Spacecraft systems are complex, multifunctional real-time sys-
tems with many different types of physical subsystems.
Although functional models may exist for many subsystems,
functional descriptions at the spacecraft level are typically
informal and incomplete. With the additional complexities of
VLSI and autonomous maintenance, informal design methods,
particularly at the system level, may no longer produce the
desired results {witness the evolution of computer operating
system design methods).
One goal of this component is to investigate whether
design languages, such as those being used in the context of
computer and computer-based systems, can be usefully ex-
tended to facilitate spacecraft design. Of particular relevance
are languages that call lot timeliness, fault tolerance, distri-
buted resources, and concurrent (parallel) execution of tasks.
A second related gt,al is to develop uniform functional
models {abstract representations)of autonomously maintained
spacecraft. The models sought are hierarchical models that
relate high-level functional behavior of the total system to
lower-level subsystem functions and interactions, both during
normal operation and in various modes of fault recovery or of
degraded operation. This type of model can facilitate the
design process and may, in the future, lead to design automa-
tion tools for spacecraft design. Functional models might also
be used to formally verify the system.
With the increas_ in logical complexity required fl)r advanced
ASM spacecraft, model-based evaluation and testing may not
suffice to provide the desired cunt+idence it_ the system, l]_e
third goal is to investigate the possibtlity of extending formal
verification methods (such as those being developed tbr pro-
grams, operating systems, and at least one avionics processor)
so as to apply to formal descriptions of spacecraft.
The areas of specification language, formal functional
models, and formal verification techniques are intimately
related, and are thus grouped into one component in this
plan. This represents long-term, high-risk research, but the
payoff can be enormous.
E. Summm osvstommm
Two supporting developments have been suggested by the
research group. The first, of immediate urgency, is ASM data
base development. The second is development of a spacecraft
laboratory for ASM integration patterned after a similar
development within NASA.
I. Data Base Development. A comprehensive data base
should be established for ASM development. It should serve
as a repository of two types of data.
The first is statistical data required to determine values of
parameters for reliability and performance models. Currently
used data is often incomplete and inaccurate. Data sought
should include piecepart failure data (,particularly transient
failures), data on VLSI failure mechanisms, and data on sub-
system failures, system failures, and that on the environment
gathered t'_om past missions.
The second type of data is information on existing (perhaps
generic) spacecraft systems and subsystems, and information
on redundancy and ASM techniques already being used on
spacecraft. There is a significant problem of technology trans-
fer between spacecraft designers and researchers. This type of
data base would provide a multidiscipline exchange that may
be indispensable in advancing the state of the art in ASM.
2. Spacecraft Laboratory. This is a much more ambitious
development. It would consist of a computing facility for ASM
spacecraft integration (analogous to NASA's Airlab for avion-
ics systems). This is envisioned as a facility where spacecraft
simulations would be provided. New hardware/software sub-
systems could be integrated and tested using the system, and
new system designs could be developed and simulated. Such a
facility would be used for experimental testing of prototype
spacecraft systems. It would be national in scope and provide
both access and a focus for information exchange between
manufacturers and researchers.
2O
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Conclusions and Recommendation
ASM is a logical, evolutionary change to the Air Force's
concept of space system operations that results in the transfer
of functions from the ground segment to the space segment.
With ASM, the role of the ground segment becomes one of
supervisory control and operations management, rather than
detailed control of operations. Experience has shown that,
generally, spacecraft have enough spares to meet mission life-
time requirements, so additional redundant parts are not
necessarily needed for ASM.
In the opinion of the study participants, the present system
and current spacecraft operate quite well in that mission objec-
tives and user data needs are satisfied. The present space seg-
ment, however, was designed to operate with man and his
ground control function as an integral element. Successful
space segment operatl,m currently requires closure through the
ground segment both before and after the occurrence of faults.
ASM will remove this requirement from the day-to.day activ-
ities of space segment operations.
I. Conclusions
The following conclusions are those of the stud?,' group
participants and result from analysis of the material developed
during this stud).
I. ASM would reduce the vulnerability problem. There is a
need to decrease space segment dependence on the ground
segment because the ground segment is vulnerable to both
hostile action and operator error. By eliminating dependence
on the ground segment for fault detection, isolation, and
recovery management, and for routine operations functions
such a._ power management and ephemeris updating, space
system vulnerability will be significantly reduced.
2. The ASM capability n_d not impose operational con-
straints on the system user, If anything, the user should per-
ceive a more responsive spacecraft with ASM present. New
procedures for user system operations and data retrieval
should not be required. Data outage resulting from most
internal faults would be reduced from hours to seconds,
making the ASM capability virtually transparent to the space
segment data user.
3. ASM would require a change in the conduct of opera-
tions and control. The role of the ground segment in system
operations must be redefined. Detailed control of routine
operations and maintenance functions would be assumed by
the space segment, with supervisory ground control. Supervi-
sory control would be maintained by an audit trail capability
that would provide nonreal.time (up to 6 months)visibility
into maintenance actions, and by the capability for ground
segment override of space segment autonomous actions.
I'D
4. ASM would add complexity to the sptcecr_t design;
thmfore, new methodsfor epec_in8, tminl, end v_didttin8
ASM4ulmented 8qpececraft ue needed. Concepts for specify-
ing, testing, and validating Kround-based, fault-tolerant pro-
cessing systems have recently been developed. Interaction
between computer and spacecraft technologists during this
study has shown these concepts to be applicable to ASM. New
method, _gies for design and analysis are required to address
such i_ .es as fault coverage and recovery latency, measures of
effectiveness, risk assessments, and proof-of-correctness.
5. A more effective means of transferring technology from
research to applications programs would be required. The ASM
study has served as a forum for the exchange of technology
between researchers and a_plication specialists. A continuation
of information exchanges between these two communities will
increase the level of awareness of both the technological prob-
lems and their potential solLttions. As noted above in item 4,
the collective experience of fault-tolerant data processing sys-
tem specialists can serve as a surrogate for guiding the evolu-
tion of new spacecraft methods and new technologies required
to satisfy space segment environmental constraints.
6. New technology developments would be required. Two
specific technological developments were identified:
(1) A highly reliable fault-tolerant computing capability
with nonvolatile back-up memory to enable autono-
mous maintenance.
(2) An autonomous navigation capability to enable inde-
pendence of routine ground operations.
The fault-tolerant computing system is expected to have
complete authority over spacecraft resources employed during
reconfiguration by using hierarchical recovery management
algorithms, diagnostic test procedures, fault-trail reporting
mechanisms, and normal spacecraft operations. This authority
must manage contention for system resources and manage
subsystem interdependencies arising during anomolous opera-
tions The conceptual design requirements for 60-day/6-month
autonomy necessitates moving the navigation function from
the ground to the spacecraft.
7. A strong corporate commitment to ASM by the Air
Force would be required to make ASM successful. The imple-
mentation of ASM would be a phased program, with the
spacecraft fleet evolving from non-ASM to ASM spacecraft
over a period of several years. The spacecraft would not
instantly become totally autonomous. The pace of ASM
development and implementation would depend upon the
resources, technology, and chosen program applications that
are provided. To plan the implementation of ASM and coordi-
nate the actions of the System Program Offices and the
ground segment, a strong, long-term corporate commitment
would be needed. This would insure successful integration of
ASM into the Air Force's space system.
8. Confklence in ASM must be instilled by creation of a
systematic modeling, analysis, and demonstration program.
Total confidence in ASM will result only after operations are
proven to be predictable and understandable. However,
proof-of-concept demonstrations of such individual ASM
capabilities as battery reconditioning, autonomous recovery
from bus undervoltage conditions, and autonomous computer
self-diagnoses, will help provide early confidence in ASM.
Confidence will be further established during the transition
phase when quantitative figures of merit for ASM and non-
ASM strategies can be developed within the flight
environment.
9. ASM is a viable concept. ASM is the technological
infusion of ground-based hnctions into long-lived, highly-
reliable spacecraft. These functions are well understood and
operating successfully on the ground now. Precepts borrowed
from fault-tolerant computing will provide guidance for eval-
uation of fault-detection, isolation, and recovery techniques
appropriate to the space environment. Other studies are in
progress that will provide insight into the solution of the
autonomous navigation problem, and no other technology
gaps have been identified. Thus, ASM is workable and, given
the urgency of the present situation, it should be started now.
II. Recommendation
The study group recognizes the need for ASM, and has
found the technology available in today's spacecraft systems
to be a good foundation from which to proceed to ASM.
The plan presented is practicable;it aims at a series of prudent,
gradually expanding (from subsystem to system level) capabil-
ity demonstrations. The study group therefore recommends
that the Air Force proceed with the technology development
and research programs as outlined in the Implementation
Plan and Research Agenda. These programs would provide
the earliest possible demonstration of ASM as a valid system-
level capability, and lay the research-oriented groundwork for
the "second generation" ASM of the 1990s.
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